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In this paper the author discusses recent theories on the relationship between growth 
and inequality, and asks whether the two move together or not. Output growth can be 
due to increases in either physical capital, human capital, the labour supply or the level 
of technology, and the author argues that each of these represents a mechanism that 
relates  our  two  variables  of  interest.  The  literature  indicates  that  there  are  two 
difficulties in answering the question. The first concerns causation, since inequality 
affects growth, growth impacts distribution, and third factors have an effect on both. 
The second is the fact that, depending on the source of growth, inequality and growth 
may be positively or negatively related. This means that we have to be much more 
precise in the way in which we ask the question. On the one hand, we need to identify 
the particular source of growth before we can assess how it relates to inequality. On 
the other, different dimensions of inequality have different impacts. Both the theory 
and the empirical evidence indicate that inequality at the top of the distribution does 
not have the same effect as inequality at the bottom. 
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represents a mechanism that relates our two variables of interest. The 
literature indicates that there are two difficulties in answering the question. 
The first concerns causation, since inequality affects growth, growth 
impacts distribution, and third factors have an effect on both. The second 
is the fact that, depending on the source of growth, inequality and growth 
may be positively or negatively related. This means that we have to be 
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The relationship between growth and income inequality has occupied the 
attention of the profession for some 50 years, since the appearance of Kuznets 
(1955) pioneering work, and is both important and controversial. It is important 
because policy makers need to understand the way in which increases in output 
will be shared among heterogeneous agents within an economy, and the 
constraints that this sharing may put on future growth. Its controversy derives 
from the fact that it has been difficult to reconcile the different theories, 
especially since the empirical evidence has been largely inconclusive.
1 
A first aspect of the debate concerns causation. Does the growth process have 
an impact on inequality? Or does the distribution of income and wealth among 
agents determine aggregate growth? Moreover, an economy’s growth rate and 
its income distribution are both endogenous outcomes of the economic system. 
They are therefore subject to common influences, both with respect to structural 
changes as well as macroeconomic policies. Structural changes that affect the 
rewards to different factors will almost certainly affect agents differentially, 
thereby influencing the distribution of income. Likewise, policies aimed at 
achieving distributional objectives are likely to impact the aggregate economy’s 
productive performance. Being between endogenous variables, the income 
inequality-growth relationship -whether positive or negative - will reflect the 
underlying common forces to which they are both reacting as well as the direct 
impacts that one may have on the other. 
A second cause of controversy is that each of the theories proposed explores a 
single mechanism applicable only to particular types of countries. Theories 
about rural-urban migration, such as the Kuznets hypothesis, cannot describe 
the relationship between inequality and growth in mature industrialised 
                                                            
1 See Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999), Bertola (2000) and Bertola, Foellmi, and 
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economies; models based on credit market imperfections are applicable only to 
those economies where such imperfections are substantial; and the concept of 
skilled-biased technical change adds little to our understanding of the 
relationship between the two variables in countries with stagnant technologies. 
In this paper I review recent developments in the theory of growth and 
distribution. My focus will be on those theories that can help us understand the 
relationship between these two variables in modern, industrialised economies. 
In these countries, the growth process is the result of a combination of 
technological change, capital accumulation -either physical or human-, and 
changes in the supply of labour. I will argue that each of these represents a 
possible mechanism creating a link between inequality and growth. Causation 
need not be the same in all cases. It could run from growth to inequality, from 
inequality to growth, or there may be other factors, such as policies and 
technologies, that simultaneously determine both. I make no a priori distinction 
between these, as all of them can be present in one form or another. 
Two crucial questions arise for the policy maker. The first one is whether 
inequality is a pre-requisite for growth. The early approaches to the relationship 
between distribution and growth argued that inequality was a necessary 
condition for growth, as it led to both a higher rate of saving and investment 
and to stronger incentives for agents to exert high effort. As we will see, there 
are also reasons why a more dispersed distribution of income reduces the rate of 
growth, and an answer to the importance of the two effects can only be 
provided by the empirical evidence.  
A second question is whether the growth process brings about an increase in 
inequality, implying a conflict between productive efficiency and distributive 
considerations. In order to answer, it becomes essential to consider the precise 
source of growth. When growth is caused by human capital accumulation, it 
will tend to make the distribution of income less dispersed. However, INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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technology-driven growth could have the opposite effect, implying a positive 
correlation between inequality and growth. 
Moreover, certain structural parameters of the economy or policies will have 
an impact on both distribution and output growth. An example of this is labour 
taxation. Higher taxes on labour will imply shorter working hours, which in 
turn will have two effects. On the one hand, shorter hours imply lower 
utilization of capital, reducing the incentives to invest and hence growth. On the 
other, diminishing returns imply that shorter hours increase the hourly wage 
rate and lower the return to capital, thus reducing inequality.  That is, inequality 
and growth will be positively related even if there is no causal effect of one on 
the other. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section decomposes a country’s 
growth rate into four components: technological change, human and physical 
capital accumulation, and changes in the labour supply. I then examine the 
mechanisms relating inequality and growth considering these components one 
by one. Section 3 looks at technology and human capital, in order to assess the 
impact of inequality on growth and that of growth on inequality. Section 4 
considers the inequality-growth relationship when growth is driven by physical 
capital accumulation, and identifies a number of factors that will influence both. 
I then address the question in terms of the effects of changes in the labour 
supply. The last section concludes. 
 
2. A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
2.1. The determinants of output growth 
In order to examine what are the determinants of the rate of growth of an 
economy, let us consider an aggregate production function of the form 
) , , ( A L K F Y =  INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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where  K denotes the aggregate physical capital stock, L a measure of the 
aggregate labour supply, and the function F(.) exhibits constant returns to scale 
to capital and labour. We can interpret A as the level of labour augmenting 
productivity or total factor productivity (TFP). It captures the level of 
technology but also the “quality” of the labour input or human capital. 
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where  K s  and  L s  are, respectively, the capital share and the labour share in 
aggregate output, and  1 = + L K s s  because of our assumption of constant returns 
to scale. That is, the rate of growth depends on the growth rates of physical 
capital, labour productivity, and the labour supply, as well as on the (possibly 
endogenous) factor shares. 
This traditional approach to growth accounting can be extended in two 
directions. First, note that the aggregate labour supply is equal to the product of 
the number of employed individuals (P), the fraction of those that are employed 
(e), and the number of hours each employed individual works, (H). That is, 
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Growth then depends also on changes in participation, the employment rate, 
and hours worked. 
A second extension is to allow for worker heterogeneity in terms of their 
education or skills. The literature tends to define those with only high-school 
education as “unskilled workers” and those with college education as “skilled 
workers”, and I will follow this convention, although there are clearly sources 
of skills other than formal education. A possible way of introducing this 
heterogeneity is to write the labour supply in terms of efficiency units of labour. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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That is,  u s L xL L + = , where Ls and Lu denote, respectively, the supplies of 
skilled and unskilled workers and the former are x times more productive than 
the latter. Since skilled labour is more productive, growth accelerates as a 
greater fraction of the population becomes skilled. A common way to account 
for this is to suppose that A is a combination of pure technological change and 
the average number of years of education in the labour force. 
The contribution of these factors to per capita output growth varies across 
countries and over time. Figure 1 reports a growth accounting exercise where 
per capita GDP growth is decomposed into four elements: human capital, 
physical capital, hours per capita, and TFP. There are wide variations across 
countries. For example, human capital was a major contributor in France but 
negligible in Germany. Changes in hours of work (per capita) were a factor that 
reduced growth in France, Germany and Japan, while they increased it in 
Spain.
2 The role of TFP also varies widely; it was negligible for Spain but 
accounted for 0.7 and 0.8 points in the US and Austria, respectively.  
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Source:  Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2008). 
Notes: The data for Germany cover only the period 1991-2003. 
 
                                                            
2 Note that hours per capita is the product of hours per worker, the employment rate and the 
participation rate. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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Table 1 reports growth rates for the three EU countries, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain, that experienced fast growth in the last two decades of the 20th century. 
The rate of growth of per capita GDP is decomposed as the sum of the rates of 
growth of total factor productivity (TFP), the capital-labour ratio, employment, 
and participation. The table indicates very different patterns across countries but 
also over time for a given country. The increase in capital per worker played an 
important role in both Portugal and Spain, while in Ireland its contribution was 
modest in the earlier period and negative in the latter one. In contrast, TFP 
growth was the single most important factor driving growth in Ireland. The 
increase in the rate of labour force participation has contributed substantially to 
GDP growth, and in some instances, notably in Spain, it systematically 
accounted for a greater fraction of increases in output than TFP growth. 
 
Table 1- Growth accounting – Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
 Ireland  Portugal  Spain 
 1984-93 1994-98 1984-93 1994-98 1984-93  1994-98 
TFP  2.2 3.1  0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0 
Capital  per  worker  1.0 -0.3 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.4 
Employment  rate 0.3 0.6  0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.2 
Participation  rate  0.4 2.2  0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Per  capita  GDP  3.9 5.6  3.5 2.8 2.5 2.3 
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2.2.     Individual incomes and inequality 
Let us now consider individual incomes. The market income of individual i of 
skill level j is given by  i j i ij H w rK Y + = , where  i K  is the individual’s stock of 
capital or wealth, r the rate of return,  j w  the hourly wage rate for workers of 
type j, and  i H  the individual’s hours of work. Any measure of inequality will 
be a function of the distribution of relative incomes, hence we need to define 
agent i’s income relative to mean income, namely  ) / /( N Y Y y ij ij ≡ . Relative 
income can be expressed as  
p
h s k s y i j L i K ij
1
ω + =  
where  ki and hi denote, respectively the agent’s physical capital and hours 
relative to the mean, N is the population,  j ω  the wage of type j workers relative 
to the average wage, and  p≡P/N is the participation rate.  
An inequality index for market incomes, I, can then be defined as a function 
of individuals’ relative incomes, that is,  ( ) ij y I Φ = . Inequality then depends on 
factor shares, the distribution of physical capital, the relative skilled and 
unskilled wages, hours of work, and the participation rate. To this list, we 
should add taxes and transfers set by the government which, for a given 
distribution of market incomes, will determine inequality in disposable income. 
A common index of inequality is the Gini coefficient, and an example of how 
some of these factors affect it is given in Box 1. What is important for our 
purposes is that the variables determining the distribution of income are the 
same ones that we have seen affect the rate of growth. Each of these elements 
hence represents a channel that potential links, in a causal or non-causal way, 







































Box 1 : The Gini coefficient in a model economy 
Consider an economy with four types of agents characterised as follows:  
•  A fraction  p − 1  of the labour force are not employed, and receive a 
government transfer T ; 
•  A fraction l of the labour force are unskilled workers earning a wage 
u w ; 
•  A fraction s of the labour force are skilled workers. Of those  κ − s  
own no capital and have an income equal to the skilled wage  s w ; 
•  There are κ  skilled worker-capitalists, each of whom earns profits π  as 
well as the wage  s w . 
We can define the labour share as  ( ) y l w s w s u s L / + ≡ . Our assumptions 
also imply that the profits received by each worker-capitalist are 
κ π / ) 1 ( y sL − = .  
The degree of income inequality can be measured by the Gini 
concentration index computed across the four groups of population. With 
four subgroups, the definition of the Gini concentration index is 
  j i
ij
j i n n y y
y







    
where  i y  is the income in group i relative to average income, and  i n  
denotes the relative weight of group i in the population.  
Given our assumptions and denoting by w the average wage, the Gini 












p s s Gini
u s
L L g 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( κ . 
Assuming, for simplicity, a constant proportional tax rate τ  on all 
incomes, and recalling that the transfer was equal to T, we can write the Gini 
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⎛ − − − + − − − = ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( τ τ κ τ . 
The Gini coefficient is thus a function of population proportions, the labour 
share  L s , the wage differential  w w w u s / ) ( − , the participation rate, p, and 
government transfers and taxes. A greater wage differential between the 
skilled and the unskilled and lower participation raise the Gini coefficient. 
The effect of the wage share is ambiguous. This is a standard effect when 
there is inequality within groups (workers) and between groups (capital-
owners versus non capital-owners). On the one hand, a higher wage share 
reduces the income differential between those who own capital and those 
who do not, as captured by the first term in the above equation; on the other, 
for any given wage differential, a higher wage share increases the weight 
that the wage distribution has in total market income and raises inequality. 
If, however, labour income is more equally distributed than capital income, 
the first effect dominates and a higher labour share is associated with a 
lower Gini coefficient. Lastly, both a higher tax rate and a higher transfer 
rate reduce inequality in disposable incomes.  INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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Let me illustrate the importance of the various the sources of inequality with 
some recent data for the US, the UK and Germany. Figure 1 depicts the 
contribution to gross household income inequality of four sources of income: 
wage income, capital income, self-employment income, and a broad category 
(other) which includes all other incomes such as government transfers, 
pensions, alimony, etc. The contribution of, say, wage income is a combination 
of inequality in wages and the weight that wage income has in total household 
income. By definition the sum of the contributions of the four factors is equal to 
one.  
 

















  Source:  Breen, García-Peñalosa, and Orgiazzi (2008).  
Notes: Data from the Luxembourg Income Study. The inequality measure used is the 
squared coefficient of variation. The data for the UK is for 1999. 
 
We can see that although in all three countries wage income accounts for the 
largest share of inequality, its contribution varies substantially. Wage income 
inequality accounts for over 80 per cent of overall inequality in the US, but its INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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contribution in the UK and Germany is substantially lower. In the UK, self-
employment income plays a particularly important role accounting for 30 per 
cent of income dispersion, while in Germany the contribution of capital income 
inequality was 15 per cent, substantially higher than in the two Anglo-Saxon 
economies. 
So far we have considered, in line with traditional analyses of income 
inequality, two sources of heterogeneity across agents: differences in their 
endowment of physical capital or wealth and in their human capital. In what 
follows, I will examine these two sources of heterogeneity separately. To be 
more precise, let us consider again the relative income of agent i, which is given 
by  p h s k s y i j L i K ij / ω + = .  We can identify three elements in this expression. 
The first one is the relative wage,  j ω , which measures the way in which 
different types of labour are rewarded and captures the effect of the distribution 
of labour earnings on income inequality. In the next section of the paper I will 
focus on differences in human capital endowments, examining the arguments 
that link growth to the returns to education, and ignoring differences across 
agents other than their level of education.   
The second element in the above expression are factor shares,  K s  and  L s ,  
which capture how capital and –some aggregate measure of– labour are 
rewarded. In order to focus on this aspect, section 4 will ignore differences 
across workers and consider as the only source of heterogeneity differences in 
initial wealth endowments. Lastly,  i h  and  p  capture elements of the labour 
supply –hours per worker and participation–. I will argue that hours of work are 
closely related to the rewards to capital and labour, and hence consider again 
differences in wealth endowments as the source of inequality. Our discussion of 
the causes and effects of labour market participation needs, however, other 
sources of heterogeneity that may determine who decides to go to work and 
who does not. I will then focus on two groups of individuals that have INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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historically had different degrees of labour market attachment, men and women, 
and the implications that changes in female labour market participation have for 
inequality and growth. 
3. TECHNOLOGY AND THE QUALITY OF LABOUR 
Human capital has played a key role in the new growth theories.
3 On the one 
hand, these theories have emphasized that just as economies accumulate 
physical capital, it is possible to accumulate human capital to generate higher 
per capita output. On the other, building on the seminal work of Nelson and 
Phelps (1966), one of the most important lessons that these theories have taught 
us is that we cannot separate the process of human capital accumulation from 
that of technological change. Nelson and Phelps argued that a major role for 
education is to increase the individual’s capacity to innovate and to adapt to 
new technologies. This complementarity between education and innovation 
activities has two important implications. First, technological change requires 
educated workers. Indeed, the new growth theories have emphasized the 
importance of having an educated labour force in order to have R&D-driven 
growth. Second, under the Nelson and Phelps approach to human capital, 
workers with different levels of education are not perfect substitutes. In 
particular, skilled or high-educated workers are able to implement and/or use 
new technologies, while unskilled workers are not. As a result, their relative 
rewards depend not only on the relative supplies of high- and low-education 
workers, but also on the speed and on the type of technological change. This 
has given rise to an extensive literature that explores the concept of biased 
technical change and its implications for wage inequality. 
At the same time, the education expansion that took place in industrialised 
countries in the second half of the twentieth century has been seen as an 
important force in reducing income inequality over the period, as the increase in 
                                                            
3 See Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).  INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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the relative supply of skilled workers resulted in a reduction of their wage 
relative to that of the unskilled. This would seem to indicate that growth, when 
driven by human capital, will be accompanied by a reduction in inequality. The 
relationship between human capital, growth and distribution is, however, more 
complex than this simple argument would indicate. On the one hand, inequality 
can affect both innovation and human capital accumulation, and through these 
the rate of growth. On the other, technological change itself can affect wage 
inequality in ways that complement or offset the impact of changes in the 
skilled labour force. In this section, I discuss these two arguments, and then turn 
to some of their policy implications.
  
3.1. The impact of inequality on growth 
The traditional view that inequality should be growth-enhancing is based on 
three arguments. First comes Kaldor’s hypothesis, formalized by Stiglitz 
(1969), that the marginal propensity to save of the rich is higher than that of the 
poor. If the growth rate of GDP is directly related to the proportion of national 
income that is saved, more unequal economies are bound to grow faster than 
economies characterized by a more equitable distribution of income. A second 
reason why inequality may enhance growth has to do with investment 
indivisibilities: investment projects, in particular the setting up of new 
industries or the implementation of innovations, often involve large sunk costs. 
In the absence of a broad and well-functioning market for shares, wealth 
obviously needs to be sufficiently concentrated in order for an individual (or a 
family) to be able to cover such large sunk costs and thereby initiate a new 
industrial activity. Hence a sufficiently concentrated distribution of wealth is a 
pre-requisite for growth. Lastly, the idea that there is necessarily a trade-off 
between productive efficiency and equality is based on incentive 
considerations, first formalized by Mirrlees (1971). Namely, when individual 
output depends on the unobservable effort borne by agents, rewarding them INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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with a constant wage independent from output performance will obviously 
discourage them from investing any effort. 
The idea that income inequality is necessary to foster effort remains central in 
the growth literature, as I will discuss in the next subsection. However, the 
recent literature has refuted the first two arguments on the grounds that, even 
though they might be important at the early stages of development, in modern 
industrialised economies capital markets are sufficiently developed for 
investments in physical capital not to be constrained by personal wealth or 
domestic savings. Nevertheless, the idea that credit constraints are important 
has been explored in relation to investments in human capital and, as we will 
see, has yielded very different conclusions.  
3.1.1. Inequality, incentives and innovation 
One of the cornerstones of the new growth literature is the Schumpeterian idea 
that innovation is endogenous and responds to market conditions and economic 
incentives. Moreover, innovation is, to a large extent, performed by 
entrepreneurs and hence the determinants of entrepreneurship will affect 
growth. Entrepreneurship is characterized by large risks, and there exists plenty 
of evidence supporting this fact. For example, in the United States, 61.5 per 
cent of businesses exit within five years, and the founder of a private company 
faces a risk of about 10 per cent of losing all his/her investment in the first ten 
years. At the same time, the cross-sectional standard deviation of self-
employment earnings is substantially higher than that of wages from paid 
employment.
4 In order to induce individuals to become entrepreneurs and 
innovators rather than employees, large returns are required to compensate for 
these risks. The immediate implication is that the higher the income of a 
successful entrepreneur is relative to wages in employment, the larger the 
fraction of the population that choose entrepreneurship, and hence the faster the 
                                                            
4 See, respectively, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Hamilton (2000). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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rate of innovation is. That is, greater income inequality will result in faster 
technological change and growth. 
Surprisingly, the fact that greater inequality induces more entrepreneurship 
does not imply that redistribution hampers growth. On the contrary, a certain 
degree of income redistribution can increase entrepreneurship and the rate of 
growth. The reason is that redistribution provides insurance to all agents 
undertaking risky activities as it guarantees a minimum income in the case of 
failure. This effect reduces income uncertainty and hence induces more 
entrepreneurship.
5 
3.1.2. Inequality and human capital investments   
Investments in education –or human capital– have two important features. The 
first one is that young agents’ education investments are strongly affected by 
parental income. A possible cause of this correlation between parental income 
and education are credit market imperfections. Human capital is embodied in 
the individual, making it difficult to use education as collateral against which to 
borrow. This aspect implies that, even in rich economies, borrowing in order to 
invest in education is difficult and costly, and as a result the distribution of 
income can affect the level of education in the economy. Public education can, 
to some extent alleviate this effect, but the correlation between income and 
tertiary education is strong even in countries where education is free. The 
reason for this is the fact that family wealth provides insurance against the risk 
of failing at university. The absence of such insurance discourages the 
offsprings of poor household from undertaking risky education investments, 
while individuals from wealthier families choose to make such investments.
6  
The second feature is that investments in education are characterized by 
strong diminishing returns, implying that it is more efficient to invest a little in 
                                                            
5 See García-Peñalosa and Wen (2008).  
6 Galor and Zeira (1993) examine the effect of inequality on education when there are credit 
constraints, while Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2004) and García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) condier 
the role of uncertainty. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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many individuals than a lot in few. To illustrate the way in which distribution 
affects education think of a situation in which it is simply not possible to 
borrow in order to study so that any investment in education has to be financed 
by family wealth. High wealth concentration implies that only those at the top 
of the distribution will invest. Although these investments can be large, strong 
diminishing returns imply that, at the margin, they are not very productive. 
Alternatively, suppose that wealth is evenly distributed. All agents in the 
economy are now able to study, making small but highly productive 
investments, which result in a higher average level of human capital. In other 
words, a more equal distribution of wealth leads to a higher average stock of 
human capital. 
How does this affect growth? There are three ways in which education will 
affect the rate of growth. The first is simply through factor accumulation: more 
efficiency units of labour result in a higher level of output. The second is due to 
the fact that R&D needs to be performed by highly educated individuals. The 
more educated the labour force is, the more workers will be available to 
undertake research and development, and hence the faster the rate of innovation 
will be. Lastly, as argued by Nelson and Phelps, educated individuals are better 
at adopting new technologies. A more educated labour force will then result in 
faster or more widespread adoption of new technologies, leading to faster 
growth. 
The mechanism I have just described implies that a more unequal distribution 
of wealth will result in lower levels of human capital, less innovation and 
adoption, and slower growth. This contrasts with the argument presented in the 
previous subsection that greater income inequality creates incentives for 
entrepreneurship and hence leads to innovation and faster growth. Note, 
however, that the two mechanisms are compatible and can be simultaneously in 
operation. The risk associated with entrepreneurship implies that the rewards to 
successful entrepreneurs need to be higher than the wages similar individuals INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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can obtain, and hence it is inequality at the top of the income distribution that 
creates the right incentives. In contrast, the second approach is based on the 
idea that the returns to investments in education are highest at low levels of 
human capital, and hence growth requires low inequality at the bottom of the 
distribution. This means that greater inequality will increase the rate of growth 
if it is due to an increase in dispersion at the upper end of the distribution, and 
reduce it whenever it is caused by more dispersion at the bottom. 
3.2. The impact of technological change on labour market 
inequalities 
Wage income is the main source of personal and household income, and 
hence its distribution has major implications for inequality. A large literature 
has hence examined the evolution of the distribution of labour earnings,
7 and 
documented that in the last two decades of the 20
th century a number of 
industrialised countries experienced a substantial widening in the earnings 
distribution.
8 The most spectacular rise has undoubtedly taken place in the UK 
and the US. Between 1980 and 2000, the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile 
of the earnings distribution rose by 14 per cent in the UK and by 21 in the US.
9 
Although not all economies experienced this rise in earnings inequality – 
notably France and Germany – most developed economies have seen the 
secular trend of stable or falling earnings inequality reversed in the 1980s and 
1990s. Moreover, the evidence clearly indicates that an important component of 
the increase in earnings inequality has been an increase in the so-called relative 
wage, that is the ratio of the hourly wage of those with tertiary education (also 
termed skilled workers) to that received by those with only secondary education 
(called unskilled).  
                                                            
7 I will use the terms wage distribution and earnings distribution interchangeably, even if this is not 
entirely accurate. 
8 See the overview provided by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and Atkinson (2007) for recent 
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In order to understand the determinants of the relative wage we need to think 
of different types of labour as not being perfect substitutes, implying that the 
supply of skilled and unskilled workers will affect their rewards. Moreover, if 
the two types of labour are imperfect substitutes, technical change may not 
affect the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers in the same way.
10 This 
can be easily captured by an aggregate production function in which we allow 
for skill-specific technologies, with  s A  representing the technology used by the 
skilled and  u A  that used by the unskilled. That is, output can be expressed as 
) , , ( u u s s L A L A K F Y = ; see Box 2. The evolution of the relative wage then 
depends on two forces: changes in relative labour supplies and changes in the 




















                                                                                                                                                        
9  Author’s calculations from OECD “Trends in earnings dispersion” database. See also Checchi and 
García-Peñalosa (2008b).  
Box 2: A production function with biased technical change 
 To capture the idea of biased-technical change more precisely consider an 
aggregate production function of the form 
( )




) )( 1 ( ) ( u u s s L A L A K Y . 
The elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour is given by 
) 1 /( 1 γ − , and they use skill-specific technologies, with  s A  representing the 
technology used by the skilled and  u A  that used by the unskilled.  
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The standard effect of relative labour supplies is captured by the negative 
impact of  u s L L /  on the relative wage. Skill-biased technical change, in turn, 
is represented by an increase in the ratio  u s A A / . Under the (empirically 
validated) assumption that  0 > γ  -i.e. if skilled and unskilled labour are 






There will be two effects of growth on the relative wage. When growth is 
driven by an increase in the relative supply of skilled labour (i.e. higher ratio 
u s L L / ) it will be associated with a reduction in the relative wage. This is the 
traditional effect of education on inequality, which drove the reduction in wage 
dispersion observed in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, when growth is due to 
technical change, its effect will depend on whether  s A  or  u A  grows faster. If 
technological improvements lead to a faster increase in s A , we will say that 
there is skill-biased technical change, and this will result in an increase in the 
relative wage. That is, skill-biased technical change will be accompanied by an 
increase in earnings inequality. 
One of the questions raised by this literature is why is it that after several 
decades of fast technological progress, technical change became skill-biased, 
probably some time around the late 1970s or early 1980s. A number of authors 
have examined whether technical change has become skill-biased in response to 
some external factor. Two explanations have been put forward, both of them 
based on the idea that researchers can target their innovations and make them 
complementary with either unskilled or skilled workers. The first argument 
maintains that it was the education expansion itself that changed the nature of 
technical change.
11 To understand this, we need to think of the research process 
as a fixed cost, implying that the research firm needs to sell a sufficiently large 
number of units of the new intermediate good (or technology) in order to cover 
the R&D costs. When skill labour was scarce, it was more profitable to create 
innovations that complemented the unskilled, but as the education expansion 
that started in the 1960s increased the number of workers with tertiary 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 An excellent review of this literature is provided by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005). 
11 This idea was first explored by Acemoglu (1998). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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education, it became profitable to invent machinery to be used by skilled 
workers and as a result technical change became skill-biased.  
An alternative, or rather complementary, hypothesis is that the expansion in 
trade that started in the 1980s was the trigger that changed the nature of 
innovations.
12 When new industrialising countries started imitating goods 
produced by the high-income economies, established firms in the latter 
countries experienced a sharp increase in competition due to the lower wages 
paid in the former. This competition was, however, largely restricted to those 
goods that were produced by unskilled workers since the new industrialising 
countries lacked skilled labour. The way to escape competition was hence to 
invent new products that had to be produced by the skilled workers abundant in 
high income countries and which the new industrialising economies would not 
be able to imitate. Again, technical change became skilled biased. 
3.3. Indirect effects of biased technical change 
The concept of biased technical change has proven to be a powerful tool 
relating technological progress to wage dynamics. The problem is that because 
technological progress is hard to measure directly, the only way to identify the 
effect of biased technical change is by not being able to attribute changes in the 
relative wage to other causes. These other causes have been argued to be 
changes in the internal organization of firms and in labour market institutions. 
But what is the source of changes in firms’ organization and in institutions? 
Perhaps the most enduring contribution of this literature will be the idea that 
both organizational change and the evolution of labour market institutions are 
partly the result of biased technical change. 
    A number of recent contributions have argued that technological change, 
and in particular IT-technologies, have changed the internal organization of 
firms. The overall conclusion of this literature is that technologically-induced INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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organizational change tends to increase inequality both within a firm and across 
workers in different firms, and is seen as largely responsible for the increase in 
labour earnings of top managers, and hence in earnings inequality. 
Technological progress has also been argued to be a source of changes in labour 
market institutions. What these theories argue is that the collapse of centralised 
wage bargaining in the late 20th century was the result of the increase in the 
productivity gap across workers brought about by technological progress that 
created an increased complementarity between capital goods (equipment) and 
skilled workers. Empirical evidence, in turn, indicates that changes in labour 
market institutions can account for part of the recent increase in wage 
dispersion, and have been shown to have a substantial impact on overall income 
inequality.
13 
3.4. Human capital, inequality and the welfare state 
The determinants of the degree of income inequality in a country include 
social and political forces as well as economic ones. In particular, government 
transfers can be an important source of household income. For example, in 
1993, social security benefits accounted for 14% of household income in the 
UK.
14 Similarly, taxes play an important redistributive role, suggesting that 
even if growth matters in shaping the distribution of income, policy choices 
also play a crucial role. In rich industrialised economies, taxes and transfers 
reduce the Gini coefficient by about a third. Moreover, differences across 
countries in taxes and transfers account for a large fraction of overall income 
inequality. In 2000/2001, the Gini coefficient for market incomes was the same 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 See Thoenig and Verdier (2003). 
13 Saint-Paul (2001) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) examine the effect of technology on 
organizational change, and support for the complementarity between technology, organizational 
change and human capital is provided by Caroli Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan at al. (2002). The 
effect on labour market institutions is analysed by Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001), while 
empirical evidence on the importance of labour market institutions for income inequality can be found 
in Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008a, 2008b). 
14  See Atkinson (1997). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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in Germany, Australia and the US, 48 per cent. The Gini of disposable income 
(i.e. after transfers and direct taxes) was, respectively, 28, 32, and 37, placing 
Germany amongst the most equal and making the US one of the most unequal 
of the high-income economies.
15  
This raises the question of what determines the degree of redistribution, or, 
more generally, the size of the welfare state in an economy. It is likely that 
redistribution is determined simultaneously with inequality itself. This is 
precisely the argument put forward by Bénabou (2005), who maintains that 
inequality, human capital accumulation, and the welfare state are jointly 
determined. 
Suppose that growth is driven by the accumulation of human capital, and that 
individuals are endowed with different levels of human capital (or education) 
and of random ability. There are three key elements in the model. First, an 
individual’s disposable income depends on her human capital, her ability, and 
the degree of redistribution, denoted τ . Second, some individuals are credit 
constrained and hence invest in the education of their offsprings less than they 
would in the absence of credit constraints. Third, individuals vote over the 
extent of redistribution, and do so before they know their children’s ability. 
Two relationships appear. On the one hand, the desired degree of 
redistribution is a decreasing function of the degree of human capital inequality 
in the economy, that is, 
) inequality ( Γ = τ  with  0 < Γ′ . 
The intuition for this is that redistribution provides social insurance against 
the uncertainty concerning ability. The more unequally distributed human 
capital is, the more unequal the distribution of expected income is and hence the 
more  expensive insurance becomes for those with high human capital. As a 
result there will be less support for redistributive policies. 
                                                            
15 See Brandolini and Smeeding (2007). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
 
23 
On the other hand, we have a relationship governing the process of human 
capital accumulation. Greater redistribution relaxes the credit constraint of the 
poor, allowing them to increase the educational attainment of their children 
which in turn results in a lower degree of long-run inequality. That is, 
) inequality ( Ψ = τ  with  0 < Ψ′ . 
Since the two relationships are decreasing, they may intersect more than once 
and give rise to two stable equilibria for the same preferences and technology. 
One equilibrium is characterized by low inequality and high redistribution, 
while the other exhibits high inequality and low redistribution. 
This approach has a number of important implications. First, the equilibrium 
relationship between inequality and redistribution will be negative, since, 
paradoxically, more equal societies choose to redistribute more. Second, 
different sources of inequality have different impacts on the extent of 
redistribution. If inequality is mainly due to differences in human capital 
endowments, the support for redistributive policies will be weaker than when 
inequality is largely due to random ability shocks. Third, which of the two 
equilibria results in faster growth is ambiguous. It depends on the distortions 
created by redistribution - in terms of the reduction of the labour supply it 
entails, as we will discuss in section 5 below - and the positive effect of a 
greater investment in education by the poor.  
  Before we turn to the question of capital and labour supply in the next 
sections, consider a possible interpretation of Bénabou’s analysis. In his 
original framework, the random term in the individual’s income function is 
interpreted as innate ability, but it can be given alternative interpretations. For 
example, uncertainty could be related to the overall performance of the sector in 
which the worker chooses to work, which in turn depends on the degree of 
openness and competition faced by the sector. Under this interpretation, an 
increase in openness would accentuate the uncertainty faced by individuals with 
a given level of human capital and lead to greater support for redistribution. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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That is, trade openness can increase the size of the welfare state and lead to a 
lower degree of inequality. The effect on growth would be ambiguous, as more 
redistribution would tend to reduce the labour supply but openness may itself 
have other positive effects on output growth. 
 
4. PHYSICAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION  
Let us turn now to how physical capital accumulation creates a link between 
inequality and growth. We will depart from our analysis in the previous section 
and suppose that all individuals are endowed with a single unit of homogeneous 
labour, so that they all receive the same wage income. Instead, let us consider 
that the only source of inequality are unequal initial endowments of capital or 
wealth.
16 
Suppose that output is produced by a large number of competitive firms 
according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function of the form 
()
α α − =
1 AL K Y , where L is the aggregate labour supply. Suppose that the only 
source of growth is the accumulation of physical capital, implying that higher 
investment on the part of firms results in faster growth. The parameter α is the 
key element linking inequality and growth. On the one hand, α  is the marginal 
productivity of capital. The higher it is, the more productive capital is and the 
more firms will want to invest, leading to faster growth. On the other, α  is the 
share of capital in aggregate income and will hence affect income inequality. To 
see this note that if the only difference across agents is their wealth, we can 
write the relative income of agent i as   ) 1 ( α α − + = i i k y . The distribution of 
income is then determined by the distribution of wealth and factor shares. For 
any given distribution of wealth (i.e. of the ki’s), the higher the capital share, the 
greater the weight of capital is in relative incomes and the more dispersed the 
                                                            
16 The discussion in this subsection follows closely the analysis in Bertola (1993) and García-Peñalosa 
and Turnovsky (2006, 2007). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
 
25 
distribution of income will be. A higher capital share, i.e. a higher value of α , 
will result in both a faster rate of growth and a more dispersed distribution of 
income. 
Growth and inequality will also be affected by policy parameters. Suppose, 
for example, that all income is taxed at a constant proportional rate τ  and that 
the revenue is used to finance a lump-sum transfer, denoted b, so that the 
individual’s relative disposable income is given by 
() b k y i i + − + − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( α α τ . Using the government’s budget constraint to 
substitute for b, we can write relative disposable income as 
() 1 ) 1 ( − − − + = i i i k k y τα α α . Individuals with above-average capital, that is, 
for whom  i k  is greater than 1, will pay a net tax, while those with below-
average  capital, i.e. with  i k  less than 1, will receive a transfer. The greater the 
tax rate, the more equal the post-tax distribution of income is. At the same time, 
a higher tax rate will reduce the net return to capital and thus its rate of 
accumulation, leading to slower growth. 
To sum-up, the two mechanisms just described imply that factors that affect 
capital accumulation  have an impact on inequality as well. When growth is 
driven by physical capital accumulation, differences in technology (α ) result in 
a positive correlation between growth and pre-tax income inequality, while 
differences in income tax rates (τ ) lead to a positive correlation between 
growth and post-tax income inequality. There is a third factor that affects the 
accumulation of physical capital, namely the labour supply.  The next section 
turns to this aspect. 
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5. LABOUR SUPPLY  
5.1. Leisure and hours of work 
As discussed in section 2 above, the aggregate labour supply is a combination 
of hours worked per employee and the fraction of the population that works, 
which in turn is the product of the rate of labour force participation and the 
employment rate. I will leave aside considerations relating to employment (or 
unemployment),
17 and focus on the other two elements. In this subsection I 
discuss how the fact that individuals can choose, to some extent, how many 
hours to work affects both growth and inequality, while subsection 5.2. 
examines the causes and effects of changes in participation rates. 
5.1.1. Factor returns and factor shares 
The last decades of the 20
th century witnessed a substantial widening of the 
gap between working hours in the United States and Europe. While in 1970 
Europeans spent about the same time at work as Americans, by 2000 working 
hours in the EU countries had fallen to 77  percent of hours worked in the US. 
As we can see in table 2, these changes in work hours implied that despite the 
large productivity gains experienced by European countries, GDP per capita did 
not catch up with that in the US. This observation has sparked a debate about 
the causes and effects of differences in labour supply, and an extensive 
literature has focused on whether taxes or preferences have driven these 
differences, and on the impact of labour supply on growth.
18 However, little 




                                                            
17 The main reason for doing so is that there is no clear evidence of a relationship between 
unemployment and inequality. See, for example, Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008a). 
18 The three competing approaches are proposed by Blanchard (2004), Prescott (2004) and Alesina et 
al. (2005). 
19 The analysis in this section and the next follows García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007, 2008) and 
Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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Table 2- GDP and hours of work 
  GDP per capita  GDP per hour  Hours per capita 
        
  1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 
US  100 100  100 100 100 100 
EU-15 69  70 65  91  101  77 
France 75  71 69  100  109  71 
Spain 50  57  47  73  105  78 
       Sources:  Blanchard (2003, 2004). 
 
In order to analyse the role of hours of work, we need to introduce an elastic 
labour supply so that agents can choose how many hours to work. The elasticity 
of leisure in the utility function then becomes a crucial parameter determining 
both the rate of growth and the distribution of income. A greater preference for 
leisure will result in fewer work hours. This in turn implies a lower utilization 
of capital and hence a lower productivity of investment, reducing the rate of 
capital accumulation and hence of growth. Countries with different preferences 
for leisure will then have different rates of growth. 
To examine the effect on inequality, let us go back to our basic relative 
income equation. Suppose, as in section 4, that the only difference across agents 
is their wealth endowment, so that the relative income of agent i can be 
expressed as   L i K i s k s y + = . With a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
the resulting constant factor shares, the endogeneity of the labour supply would 
have no effect on distribution which would only depend on the constant labour 
share and the (given) distribution of wealth. In order for hours worked to have 
an impact on the distribution of income we need to allow for changes in the 
labour share. The labour share will be endogenous with a more flexible 
production functions that the Cobb-Douglas, such as a CES production 

























The labour share is by definition equal to the product of the wage times the 
labour supply divided by aggregate output, i.e.  Y wL sL / = . An increase in 
hours worked then has two effects. On the one hand it raises the effective labour 
supply which tends to increase the labour share. On the other, it results in a 
lower wage rate which tends to reduce it. Which of these two effects dominates 
depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. The bulk of 
the evidence indicates that capital and labour are complements, so that the 
elasticity of substitution is less than one,  1 < σ .
20 Then an increase in hours 
worked would result in a lower labour share and consequently greater income 
                                                            
20 See Guvenen (2004). 
Box 3: An endogenous labour share 
To understand the effect of hours worked on the share of labour, consider 
an aggregate production function of the form 
( )
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) )( 1 ( AL K Y − + = , 
where L is the effective labour supply, given by the product of hours and 
population, that is L=hN, and  ) 1 /( 1 ρ σ − =  is the elasticity of substitution 




























and is a function of the capital labour ratio. Differentiating we have that the 
sign of  h sL ∂ ∂ /  is given by the sign of the parameter ρ . This means that 
when capital and labour are complements – that is, when  0 < ρ  and the 
elasticity of substitution is less than 1 – a higher value of h results in a lower 
labour share. An elasticity of substitution less than 1 – i.e.  0 > ρ – implies 
that the labour share is increasing in h. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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inequality. That is, increases in hours worked will result, on the one hand, in a 
faster rate of growth and, on the other, in a lower labour share and a more 
dispersed distribution of income.  
Evidence of a positive correlation between average hours worked in a country 
and the Gini coefficient of income is obtained by Alesina et al. (2005) for 
OECD economies. Figure 3 depicts weekly hours of work per capita and the 
Gini coefficient of disposable income in six countries, and the two variables 
exhibit a correlation of 0.68. Proper econometric work is needed to examine the 
robustness of this correlation, but the data seems to support the idea that hours 
and inequality tend to move together. Note, however, that there could be 
reasons for this correlation other than the one we have just explored. For 
example, if we go back to the incentive argument of section 3.1.1, a more 
dispersed distribution of income may provide stronger work incentives and 
hence increase the fraction of time devoted to work.  
 










Netherlands France UK Germany Austria US
Weekly hours of work   Gini index
 
    Sources:  Hours from Alesina at al.(2005). Gini coefficients on household disposable income for 1999  
  or 2000 from the Luxembourg Income Study (key figures). 
 




As we have seen, one possible reason why labour supplies differ across 
countries is different preferences for leisure. If preferences are the cause of 
variations in labour supply, growth rates and inequality across countries, then 
there are no strong policy implications.
21 An alternative view, put forward by 
Prescott (2004), is that the gap in labour taxes between the US and the EU has 
caused differences in time use. That is, they are the result of government policy.  
Table 3 reports hours worked and GDP per capita in France and Germany 
relative to the US, as well as the effective tax rate on labour income and the 
Gini coefficient of disposable income in the 1990s. The so-called effective 
labour tax – a combination of taxes on wages and consumption – remained 
roughly constant in the US between the 1970s and the 1990s, at 40 percent. 
However, it increased substantially in many European countries. In France it 
rose from 49 to 59 per cent, and in Germany from 52 to 59 per cent.  The timing 
of these increases coincided with the reduction on hours of work witnessed in 
the large European economies, and hence it seems a possible explanation. 
  
Table 3 - Hours of work, taxes and income inequality in the 1990s 








US 100  100  0.40  0.35 
France 68  74  0.59  0.29 
Germany 75  74  0.59  0.27 
Source:  Hours, GDP and taxes  for 1993-96 from Prescott (2004). Gini coefficients on household 
disposable income for 1994 from the Luxembourg Income Study (key figures). 
 
It is straight forward to show that higher taxes on wages and consumption 
have a substitution effect that leads to a lower labour supply and slower growth, 
                                                            
21 There may be a reason for intervention if preferences are endogenous and multiple equilibria 
possible; see  Alesina, Glasser and Sacerdote (2005). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
 
31 
and this is supported by recent empirical evidence.
22 However, the change in 
taxes raises a puzzle as to its effects on inequality. If capital endowments are 
more unequally distributed than labour endowments, then the increase in labour 
taxes should also have increased post-tax income inequality. This prediction is 
at odds with the evidence which indicates an increase in inequality in the US, 
stability in Germany, and a reduction in France over the period.
23 A possible 
explanation is that the reduction in hours caused an increase in the labour share, 
leading to lower pre-tax inequality. This effect could have been sufficiently 
strong to offset the direct distributive effect of higher taxes, so that a higher 
effective tax on labour was associated both with lower working hours and a 
more equal distribution of income. 
5.2. Women in the labour market 
One aspect that has received little attention in the recent growth literature is 
the role of labour market participation. Yet, changes in participation rates can 
have a substantial impact on per capita GDP growth, as reported in table 1. The 
table indicates that growth in participation has contributed substantially to GDP 
growth, in some instances more than TFP growth. Moreover, the increase in 
participation has been largely due to the massive entry of women in the labour 
market in these countries in the last two decades of the 20th century. Between 
1984 and 1998, both Ireland and Spain experienced an increase in female 
participation rates of over 3% per year and Portugal of 1 % per year, while male 
participation rates declined slightly over the period.
24 These numbers imply that 
the contribution of female labour market participation to output growth is of the 
same order of magnitude as that of TFP growth, and raises the question of what 
                                                            
22 See Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003). 
23 Brandolini and Smeeding (2007) document trends in inequality in these countries. 
24 Author’s calculations from “OECD Labour Force Statistics V4.4”. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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are the implications of women entering the labour market for the relationship 
between inequality and growth.
25 
There are two reasons why we would expect a relationship between female 
labour participation, inequality, and growth. The first concerns the policies that 
would promote female participation, and their relationship to wage inequality. 
The second aspect is the impact of increased participation on inequality across 
households. 
Women’s decision of whether or not to participate in the labour market is 
based on a comparison of the forgone home production if they work with the 
income obtained if employed. In all industrialised countries there is still a large 
gap between the hourly wages of men and those of women.
26 Wage gaps are 
particularly evident in two types of jobs. One are female-dominated jobs, such 
as nursing, which tend to command lower wages as compared to male-
dominated jobs with similar employee characteristics. The second are part-time 
jobs which are characterized by substantially lower hourly wages than similar 
full-time jobs. Differences in wage rates are aggravated by the fact that the tax 
rate of the income of married women is higher than that for men or for single 
women. Encouraging female participation would then require policies that 
reduce the gender wage gap and that lower the tax rate for second earners.
27 
Such policies would then lead to lower gender inequality which would increase 
participation and hence result in faster growth. 
Lower inequality between the wage rates of men and women may 
nevertheless be associated with increases in inequality when measured for other 
groups. Reducing the gender wage gap is likely to be due to an increase in the 
wages of women at the top of the earnings distribution, and hence would 
increase the dispersion of female earnings. This is precisely what we observe in 
                                                            
25 A problem with the literature trying to quantify the impact of female labour participation on growth 
is that it is difficult to quantify the size of the “household good” produced by those women not 
working in the market and which they stop producing once they engage in market production.  
26 Blau and Kahn (2000) review the literature. 
27 OECD (2004). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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the US, where the sharp reduction in the gender wage gap at the end of the 20th 
century was associated with increases in the dispersion of female hourly wages 
and female earnings.
28 In other words, faster growth will be associated with 
lower inequality across gender groups but greater inequality within groups. 
Throughout the paper we have looked at inequality among individuals, yet the 
empirical literature and policy-makers are often concerned with the distribution 
of income among households. Increased female participation and the increased 
dispersion of female earnings have had major implications for the distribution 
of household incomes. When married women did not work, the distribution of 
labour income across households was simply given by the distribution of 
earnings among men. However, once women enter the labour market, inequality 
across households also depends on the correlation between the income of a 
husband and that of his wife. Household income inequality increases or 
decreases depending on whether there is a positive or a negative correlation 
between the earnings of spouses. Existing evidence indicates that there is a 
strong positive correlation between the labour earning of husbands and wives, 
with high-earning men marrying high-earning women. As a result, increases in 
female participation rates result in a more unequal distribution of household 
income. I in the US this correlation increased in the last two decades of the 20th 
century and was part of the cause of the increase in income inequality across 
household over the period.
29 
  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper I have discussed recent developments in the theory of growth and 
distribution, focusing on those approaches that are most relevant for modern 
industrialised economies. My review has necessarily been selective and there 
are a number of aspects that have not been covered. There are two main 
                                                            
28 Evidence on this is provided by Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) and Burtless (2007). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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approaches that I have not dealt with. The first one consists of theories that 
apply to developing countries. The adoption of industrial technologies, rural-
urban migration, or the introduction of free elections, are aspects that would 
affect both inequality and growth. However, neither of these mechanisms seems 
relevant for the economies of the European Union. The second aspect that I 
have chosen not to discus is the role of  “globalization” in inducing changes in 
inequality. Globalization, or more precisely the increase in trade flows that 
occurred in the late 20
th century, is a vast phenomenon that has had a variety of 
effects. In so far as it affects the supply of factors, its impact can be examined 
in terms of the supply-side framework used in this paper. However, openness 
also changes demand patterns, and this will create additional mechanisms 
through which inequality and growth can be correlated. Space constraints have 
obliged me not to discuss these demand-side arguments. 
The supply-side approach to growth allows us to decompose a country’s 
growth rate into the growth rates of technology, physical capital, human capital, 
and labour supply. I have argued that each of these represents a channel through 
which inequality and growth are related. 
We can summarize the main arguments as follows: 
•  Inequality has two effects on the growth rate, a positive incentive 
effect, in line with the traditional literature, and a negative 
opportunity-creation effect operating through the constraints on human 
capital investment that it imposes on poor individuals. Greater 
inequality is hence conducive to growth if it occurs at the top of the 
distribution, and detrimental if it occurs at the bottom. 
•  Growth affects inequality through the impact of education and 
technological change on relative wages. On the one hand, human 
capital accumulation reduces the relative wage of educated workers 
and results in lower earnings inequality. On the other, when technical 
                                                                                                                                                        
29 This is documented by Burtless (1999). INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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change is skill-biased, faster technology-driven growth will result in 
greater earnings inequality. Either of these two offsetting forces could 
dominate, implying that growth can be accompanied by increases or 
reductions in inequality. 
•  A number of factors affect both growth and distribution. A high 
marginal productivity of capital, a low tax rate, or a weaker preference 
for leisure, encourage the accumulation of physical capital and hence 
foster growth. However, they also tend to reduce wages and the labour 
share, making the distribution of income more dispersed. This results 
in a positive correlation between inequality and growth.  
•  The increase in female labour force participation has been an 
important force driving growth in industrialized economies. The 
consequences for inequality are, however, complex. On the one hand, 
greater female participation and the consequent increase in female 
wages has reduced wage inequality between men and women. On the 
other, there has been an increase in earnings inequality amongst 
women, and this has contributed to the increase in household income 
inequality observed in some countries. 
 
Given the conflicting theoretical predictions, we would like to turn to the 
empirical evidence in order to assess the relative importance of these various 
mechanisms. A number of articles have tried to estimate the effect of growth on 
inequality, while others have examined the impact of inequality on growth. This 
literature has suffered from two problems, largely linked to the limited 
availability of data on the distribution of income. First, because of the limited 
number of observations, all types of countries tend to be grouped together 
without any consideration of whether the same mechanism applies or not to the 
entire sample. Second, establishing the direction of causality is problematic, INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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and most of the literature can at best identify cross-country correlations between 
these two variables.  
The early empirical studies based on cross-country regressions, such as Perotti 
(1996), tended to indicate a negative correlation between inequality and growth. 
As more data on inequality became available, it was possible to use more 
sophisticated econometric approaches that looked at shorter periods, included 
fixed effects, and divided the data into different groups of countries, and the 
resulting studies have found a positive, or at least more ambiguous, 
relationship. Forbes (2000) finds that when short growth spans are used, 
inequality and growth are positively correlated. Barro (2000) divides his sample 
into poor and rich countries, and his results indicate a negative correlation in the 
former and a positive one in the latter. Overall, the empirical literature has not 
bee able so far to obtain robust results on the correlation between distribution 
and growth.  
The study by Voitchovsky (2005) stands out in this literature, both because it 
uses a small sample of rich and relatively homogeneous countries for which we 
could expect the same mechanisms to apply, and because of the careful 
econometric specification used to estimate the effect of inequality on growth. 
Moreover, Voitchovsky uses different distributional measures in order to allow 
for different effects of inequality at different points of the distribution of 
income. Her results strongly support the hypothesis that, for rich industrial 
economies, greater inequality at the top fosters growth while greater inequality 
at the bottom dampens it.  
Where does this leave us in our understanding of the relationship between 
distribution and growth? I draw three conclusions from this literature. The first 
one is that, unlike the Kuznets hypothesis of the 1950s, we cannot expect the 
growth process to autonomously bring about a reduction of inequality. As a 
result, redistribution will remain a policy concern even in affluent societies. 
Second, there are different concepts of inequality which may move in opposite INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
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directions in response to a growth episode. For example, policies aimed at 
fostering growth through increased female participation will reduce wage 
inequality across genders but probably increase it across households. Lastly, 
despite the fact that we cannot single out one particular mechanism as the main 
factor relating growth and distribution, these theories can help us understand the 
likely consequences growth episodes. It becomes, however, essential to identify 
the specific source of growth in a particular country at a particular point in time 
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